Editorial  by Gorrieri, Roberto
Theoretical Computer Science 283 (2002) 269–270
www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Editorial
Security is a fast growing area of Computer Science, with increasing relevance to
real life applications such as internet transactions and electronic commerce. Theoretical
foundations for the analysis (or the design) of security aspects of these applications are
badly needed in order to validate and prove (or guarantee) their correctness. Recently
an IFIP Working Group on “Theoretical Foundations of Security Analysis and Design”
has been established (see http://www.dsi.unive.it/IFIPWG1 7/ for more details) in order
to pursue some objectives that include at least the following:
• to investigate the theoretical foundations of security as an independent discipline
with 5rm grounds in logic, semantics and complexity;
• to discover and promote new areas of application of theoretical techniques in com-
puter security;
• to make formal methods amenable to the security practitioners, hence increasing
awareness of formal veri5cation techniques for security in computer science com-
munity at large.
Hence, the scope of the IFIP working Group 1.7 encompasses all aspects of the fun-
damental mathematical theory of system speci5cation and veri5cation, which shares
with IFIP TC1 the basic 5elds of logic (5rst-order logic, temporal logic, epistemic
logic), semantics (static analysis, type theory,) formal methods and related approaches
(model-checking, theorem-proving, process algebra) and complexity.
Among the many initiatives (e.g., the WITS workshop and the school FOSAD)
promoted by the WG 1.7 that I am chairing, there is also this special issue kindly
hosted by the journal “Theoretical Computer Science”, suggested by the previous editor-
in-chief Maurice Nivat. Many papers have been solicited among those appeared in
recent well-known conferences in the area (e.g., IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Workshop) and 5ve of them survived the usual refereeing process.
The selected papers, o>ering a good spectrum of current research in the area, are
brie?y detailed below.
“Primitives for Authentication in Process Algebras” (C. Bodei, P. Degano. R.
Focardi, C. Priami) studies the problem of authentication in two process calculi for
mobility, namely the pi-calculus and the spi-calculus. In particular, two primitives are
added to these calculi, enabling the authors to discuss, on the one hand, idealised
protocols that are secure by construction and, on the other hand, to study correct im-
plementation of the given secure speci5cation.
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“Correctness of Java Card Method Lookup via Logical Relations” (E. Denney,
T. Jensen) presents a formalisation of the bytecode optimisation of the Java Card
language of Sun Microsystems, aimed at programming smart cards, form the standard
class 5le format of Java to the CAP 5le format.
“Authentication tests and the structure of bundles” (J.D. Guttman, F.J. Thayer) intro-
duces (two kinds of) authentication test for studying the correctness of cryptographic
protocols, described in the strand space formalism. Several examples are considered to
illustrate the power of the newly proposed analysis technique, including Otway-Rees,
Neuman-Stubblebine, and the Woo–Lam protocols.
“Validating Firewalls using Flow Logics” (F. Nielson, H. Riis Nielson, R.R. Hansen)
applies techniques of static analysis, based on control ?ow logic, to Cardelli’s ambient
calculus. The main result of the paper is that it is possible to de5ne a hardest attacker
such that if there exists a control ?ow estimate that shows the inability of the hardest
attacker to enter e.g., a 5rewall, then none of the in5nitely many attackers can enter
(unless they contain at least one of the passwords).
“Finite-State Analysis of Two Contract Signing Protocols” (V. Shmatikov, J. Mitchell)
is a typical example of the use of formal methods for the veri5cation of cryptographic
protocols. The paper focuses on optimistic contract signing protocols, a rather com-
plex form of protocols, usually composed by some subprotocols that may interact in
unexpected ways.
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